Parlementaire Zaken
1 - Zoals voorzien ging de Tweede Kamer donderdag 5 juli vlak voor haar
reces snel en gladjes akkoord met de wapenaankoop in Israel; media-aandacht
leek er niet meer te zijn. Meer hieronder.
2 - Schriftelijke vragen van Farah Karimi (GroenLinks) aan de minister van
Buitenlandse Zaken hierna over Israel's "targeted assassinations", met
aansluitend een standpunt van Kofi Annan.
3 - Een andersoortig bericht ["boycott of Israeli products and leisure
tourism"] komt uit het Britse Parlement, toevallig ook d.d. 5 juli.

Sharon
4 - NOS-journaal 5 juni over het bezoek van Sharon aan Europa.
Vermeld werd dat Sharon niet naar België zou gaan vanwege een onderzoek door
de Belgische justitie tegen hem vanwege misdaden tegen de menselijkheid.
Letterlijk werd daarna door Hennie Stoel gezegd: "Sharon wordt
verantwoordelijk geacht voor het beschieten van Palestijnse
vluchtelingenkampen in Libanon in 1982". Een ernstige misser, geen woord
over Sharon's verantwoordelijkheid voor de massamoord in Sabra en Shatilla.
5 - Uri Avnery: Thank you, BBC! (Sharon should be grateful, too)
6 - Twenty years on, Sharon is up to no good, Robert Fisk in Beirut,
27-6-2001

Israel Shahak
7 - Bij zijn overlijden een artikel van hem uit 1995.
Citaat:
"... It clearly points out how the Oslo process in effect advanced the
cause of the Israeli apartheid, by virtue of making it possible to brand
every Jewish or Palestinian opponent of racism as "enemy of peace"....."

Een Boycott-Israel-initiatief uit Israel:
8 - De organisatie Matzpun (=geweten) riep op 10 april 2001 de
wereldgemeenschap op om de industriële en landbouw-producten van Israël,
evenals het vrijetijdstoerisme naar dat land, te boycotten. Ze hopen daarmee
hetzelfde positieve effect te bereiken als die van de boycot tegen de
Zuid-Afrikaanse Apartheid.
De boycot moet gelden tot Israël zich volledig heeft teruggetrokken uit alle
in 1967 bezette gebieden. De initiatiefnemers roepen iedereen, ongeacht
oorsprong of nationaliteit, op om onmiddellijk zelf met deze boycot te
starten en duidelijk te maken in zijn/haar lokale gemeenschap waarover het
gaat; om de oproep op website: www.matzpun.com te ondertekenen en te
verspreiden en om zijn/haar regering onder druk te zetten om de economische
en handelsrelaties met Israël te verbreken en de economische
voorkeursbehandeling van Israël op te schorten.

NPK/WL, 8-7-2001
_______________________________________________________________________

De Wapendeal
* Woensdag 4 juli was de picketline met ongeveer 25 deelnemers bij de ingang
van de Tweede Kamer op het Plein [*] in Den Haag, georganiseerd door het NPK
en gericht tegen het voornemen van de regering [**] om in Israel Gill
antitankraketten te gaan aankopen tegen een bedrag van bijna 600 miljoen
gulden. Een petitie met argumenten tegen de aankoop werd tevens aan de leden
van de Commissies Defensie en Buitenlandse Zaken aangeboden. De picketline
trok ANP-aandacht en er was een interview met Radio Ramallah.
Jan Pronk zag het picket en lachte een beetje beschaamd, de langslopende
Jorritsma keek verstoord en er was een gesprek met Cherribi (VVD).
Hierna nog een vooraf ontvangen reactie van de SP en het standpunt van het
CDA, waar de tijd kennelijk nooit rijp is voor enigerlei druk op Israel.
Het CDA zit hierbij stevig op één lijn met de VVD, de zusterpartij van de
Likoed in de Liberale Internationale onder voorzitterschap van Bolkestein.
Een lijn waarbij de tweede V staat voor 'Vrijheid slegs vir....'.
* Donderdag 5 juli had eind van de middag de Kamer kort overleg, op verzoek
van GL, SP en D'66. Dit duurde zo'n drie minuten. Er waren 4 moties tegen de
aankoop ingediend, 1 van GL, 2 van de SP (alle drie politieke moties) en 1
(een 'technische') van D'66. Ze werden alle ontraden en zijn met "ruime
meerderheid" verworpen. Aangezien het van te voren duidelijk was dat het
kabinetsvoornemen het zou halen is er niet hoofdelijk gestemd.
Helaas meldde het NOS-journaal hierover niets.
* Zaak wordt het na nu er "alles aan doen" om te voorkomen dat andere
Europese NATO-landen het nederlandse voorbeeld gaan volgen.
Zouden we nu - de import moet nog beginnen - Israelische militaire adviseurs
in huis krijgen?

[*] De Haagsche politie had de mondeling afgesproken locatie [Binnenhof] op
het laatste moment veranderd.

[**] Cynischer kan het bijna niet: toen het 35e jaar van de bezetting van de
Palestijnse gebieden inging nam onze regering in juni haar besluit!
_____________________________________________________________________

SP-reactie
========
Den Haag, 2 juli 2001

L.S.

Recentelijk stuurde u mij een email waarin u uw zorg uit over het voornemen
van het ministerie van Defensie om anti-tankraketten van een Israëlisch
bedrijf aan te schaffen.

Ook de SP is van mening dat het ondersteunen van het Israëlisch
militair-industrieel complex door middel van wapenaankopen, terwijl er in de
regio sprake is van hoog oplopende spanningen, zeer ongepast en dus
ongewenst is.

Nederland heeft in haar wapenexportbeleid criteria vastgelegd voor het
exporteren van wapens. Zo zouden er geen wapens geëxporteerd mogen worden
naar spanningsgebieden, landen die de mensenrechten niet respecteren of
landen die onevenredig veel investeren in de opbouw van een leger. Helaas
zijn deze criteria niet bindend en bovendien niet van toepassing op de
aanschaf van wapentuig.

De SP pleit daarom voor het instellen van zogenaamde wapenimportcriteria,
dwz. criteria waaraan een land moet voldoen om wapens naar Nederland te
mogen exporteren. Deze criteria zouden dan globaal hetzelfde moeten zijn als
de huidige exportcriteria. In dat geval zou ons land nu zeker geen
wapenaankopen in Israël kunnen doen.

Beiden zouden bindend moeten zijn. Ook zou er een strikter beleid moeten
komen voor doorvoer van wapens en onderdelen naar derde landen.

Aanstaande donderdag (5/7/01) heeft de vaste kamercommissie voor defensie
een algemeen overleg, waarin onder andere de aankoop van de
anti-tankraketten besproken zal worden. Deze vergadering vindt plaats van 11
tot 13 uur.

Met vriendelijke groet,
Harry van Bommel
SP Tweede-Kamerlid
_______________________________________________________________________

CDA-standpunt
============
"Het CDA is voor de geplande wapenaankoop en zal dat donderdag 5 juli
ook bevestigen tijdens het debat. Een economische boycot van Israel is
op dit moment niet het juiste signaal aan Israel en het CDA heeft zich
daarom ook verbaasd over de houding van het ministerie van Buitenlandse
Zaken inzake de aankoop van de GILL."

Maxime Verhagen, Tweede Kamerlid CDA.
[op de CDA-website}
_______________________________________________________________________

GL-Kamervragen
=============
Schriftelijke vragen van het lid Karimi (GroenLinks) aan de minister van
Buitenlandse Zaken

1. Bent u op de hoogte van het artikel 'Kabinet Israël akkoord met meer
liquidaties'? (1) Is deze informatie juist?

2. Wat verstaat de Israëlische overheid onder 'militanten'?

3. Is het juist dat de lijst met Palestijnse 'militanten' (2) die door de
Israëlische strijdkrachten mogen worden geliquideerd is uitgebreid? Zo ja,
bent u op de hoogte op welke gronden een Palestijn aangemerkt wordt als
'militant'? (3)

4. Is het juist dat op de westelijke Jordaanoever kort na het goedkeuren van
de 'actieve zelfverdediging' een 27-jarige activist van Arafats
Fatah-beweging beschoten is? Vallen Fatah-leden, waaronder Arafat, nu ook
onder de noemer 'militanten'?

5. Hoe beoordeelt u het feit dat de nieuwe Israëlische richtlijnen de
strijdkrachten toestaan bekende 'terroristen' te doden, zelfs als zij niet
op het punt staan om een aanslag te plegen?

6. Deelt u de mening dat het genoemde liquidatie beleid een flagrante
schending is van het internationaal recht? Zo ja, hoe bent u voornemens te
handelen gezien de vele verdragen waaraan Nederland, de EU en Israël zich
gecommitteerd hebben?

7. Deelt u de mening dat de door Sharon aangekondigde liquidaties van
Palestijnse 'militanten' synoniem zijn aan buitengerechtelijke executies? Zo
neen, waarom niet?

8. Deelt u de mening dat buitengerechtelijke executies te boek staan als
'grave breaches' onder de Vierde Geneefse Conventie en dat daarmee de
Israëlische overheid zich schuldig maakt aan het plegen van oorlogsmisdaden?

9. Deelt u de mening dat het Israëlisch beleid om Palestijnse 'militanten'
uit te schakelen niet bevorderend is voor het huidige bestand en enkel een
verdere escalatie in de hand werkt?

10. Is het Israëlisch beleid om Palestijnse militanten uit te schakelen door
de EU bekritiseerd? Zo nee, waarom niet?

11. Bent u bereid in EU verband te pleiten om in navolging van de VS, Israël
op te roepen de aanvallen op Palestijnse militanten te staken?

(1) Metro 05 juli 2001
(2) De term militant wordt door Israël gehanteerd
(3) Spits 05 juli 2001

_______________________________________________________________________

ISRAEL MUST END ASSASINATIONS

UNITED NATIONS -- Associaed Press, 5 July:
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appealed to Israel on
Thursday to
immediately halt the "targeted assassinations" of
Palestinian militants.

In a strongly worded statement issued by his spokesman,
Annan said the
policy violates international law and "contradicts the
spirit, if not the letter,
of the cease-fire agreement" brokered by CIA director
George Tenet on
June 13.

Brushing aside U.S. criticism, Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon and his
closest advisers said Tuesday that Israel would stick to
its policy of
tracking down and killing suspected Palestinian militants
in a bid to prevent
Palestinian attacks that have persisted despite the truce.

A senior Palestinian official, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, called
the Israeli
policy "the biggest violation" yet of the faltering
Mideast cease-fire.

"The secretary-general is deeply disturbed by the reported
decision of the
government of Israel to continue the practice of what have
become known
as 'targeted assassinations,'" Annan's statement said.
"This policy is
contrary not only to international law, in particular
human rights law, but
also to general principles of law."

If Israel's practice of "targeted assassinations" isn't
halted, Annan said, "it
is bound to further aggravate the crisis of confidence
between the parties
and make an already extremely fragile situation even more
precarious."

The secretary-general, who has played an increasingly
important role in
trying to promote a restoration of the Mideast peace
process, reiterated
that "there is no alternative to a political settlement of
the conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians."

_______________________________________________________________________

Over het Britse Parlement
===================

A press release follows for your interest!

LONDON, 5th July 2001
A boycott of Israeli products and leisure tourism was launched at the House
of Commons last night. A packed meeting heard Members of Parliament Lynn
Jones and George Galloway pledge their support for the boycott called by the
Palestine Solidarity Campaign and 22 other organisations.

Organisers say the boycott will send a message to the Israeli Government
that British people are no longer prepared to indirectly fund Israel's war
of aggression on the Palestinian people. They also ask the British
government to stop condoning Israel's failure to implement United Nations
resolutions on Palestine.

The first target will be agricultural produce sold in the main
supermarkets, such as tomatoes, Jaffa oranges, potatoes, avocados, fresh
herbs and organic fruit and vegetables. The boycott will be lifted when
Israel ends its illegal occupation, complies with UN resolutions and ceases
human rights violations.

"This is a non-violent way to raise public awareness...", said Dr Lynn Jones
MP.

George Galloway MP spoke out against the welcome to Downing Street given to
Ariel Sharon last week. "This war criminal is given the red carpet treatment
everywhere he goes instead of being locked up for human rights abuses."

Prof. Moshe Machover said: "People ask whether the Palestinian economy will
be damaged by a boycott. Such worries do not apply in this case. The
Palestinian
economy has been throttled by Israel." He accused Israel of "smuggling
contraband", evading customs and excise
regulations as they re-export goods produced on illegal settlements in the
West Bank and Gaza.

Michel Massih, the first Palestinian QC, told the meeting that every Jaffa
orange sold contributes towards destroying the city of Jaffa.

Poet and broadcaster Michael Rosen said he would have "no problem"
supporting a cultural and academic boycott of Israel. "Just say no", he
said.

Members of Parliament supporting the campaign include John Austin, Bill
Etherington and Neil Gerrard. The veteran parliamentarian, Tony Benn, is
also a signatory along with Harold Pinter, Caryl Churchill, Emma Thompson,
Tom Paulin, Benjamin Zephaniah, Leon Rosselson, and Alexei Sayle. Among
academics supporting the boycott are Professors Steven and Hilary Rose.
Lawyers are represented by Michael Mansfield QC, Imran Khan and Gareth
Peirce. Church leaders for the boycott include the Rev. Garth Hewitt, Rev
Steven Sizer and Rev. Dr. Michael Prior.
End

Regards
Zahid Noor
Chair
Palestine Solidarity Campaign
www.palestinecampaign.org
_______________________________________________________________________

(Published in Ha'ir newspaper on Friday, June 29, 2001)

Uri Avnery:
Thank you, BBC!
(Sharon should be grateful, too)

Thank you, BBC. You have done us a great service. Indeed, you may have
helped in saving the lives of hundreds, even thousands.
Nobody can return to live the victims of Sabra and Shatilla. Even you
can't do that. But the victims of future massacres can still be saved. You
may have done that.
Ariel Sharon is deciding now the fate of our country and our region,
for years and perhaps for dozens of years. He wants to escalate the
confrontation, so as to prevent the dismantling of the settlements, his most
cherished achievement. For that he needs a massive escalation. But,
according to his way of thinking, it must not appear that Israel is
responsible for the next bloody war. The onus must fall squarely on Arafat.
Therefore, Sharon is waiting patiently for his chance, in the meantime
wrapping himself in the cloak of "self-restraint".
That is reminiscent of the situation 19 years ago. Sharon, then
Minister of Defense, wanted to invade Lebanon, in order to implement a plan
that will be discussed below. It was very difficult to find a suitable
pretext, because for 11 months not a single bullet had been fired across the
northern border, following an American-brokered cease-fire between Israel
and Lebanon (actually with the PLO).
Sharon flew to Washington in order to obtain the blessing of the
American administration for the planned invasion. The Secretary of State,
General (then, too, a general) Alexander Haig, told him that America was
bound to oppose the invasion, unless (!!!) there was a clear Palestinian
provocation. And hop, as if by invitation, the Abu-Nidal gang shot and
wounded the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. The invasion went
ahead and led to Sabra and Shatilla.
This can happen again, this time against the Palestinian Authority. And
here you come, dear BBC, and remind us of the events. The right program at
the right moment. It tells Sharon that the file is still open. The situation
regarding the indictment of war criminals has changed substantially. There
was the Pinochet affair. Milosevic, who was openly supported by Sharon, has
been extradited to the international war crimes tribunal. When deciding on
actions that may be considered war crimes, Sharon must now take into account
that the same can happen to him. In such case, the Sabra and Shatilla events
may come up.
That alone will not deter Sharon, but it may have some influence on his
decisions.
In my opinion, Sharon, too, has good reasons to be grateful to the BBC,
because the program did not go beyond the Cahan commission's findings. Like
the Cahan commission, it leaves the main, decisive question unanswered.
The Cahan commission bent backwards to limit Israel's responsibility for
the massacre. It interpreted the facts in as limited a way as possible
without insulting the intelligence of the reader. It found Sharon & Co. (the
Chief-of-Staff Rafael Eytan, the commander on the spot, Amos Yaron and
others) guilty only of closing their eyes. Meaning: they should have known
that letting the Phalangists into the camps would result in a massacre.
Since they ignored this consideration and, furthermore, did not stop the
massacre when they first heard about it, they bear "indirect" responsibility
for the atrocities.
The question that went unanswered, both in the Cahan report and in the
BBBC program, is: Why did they behave like that? What was the motive?
Perhaps the BBC program would have looked different if the file had
contained a document that was published in Haolam Hazeh newsmagazine (whose
editor-in-chief I was) on September 27, 1981. It was appended to a big
article about Sharon, explaining why the magazine had chosen him as "Man of
the (Jewish) Year", following his appointment as Minister of Defense.
Titled "The Political Map of Ariel Sharon", this document contained the
complete plan of the war that started nine months later. No prophesy was
involved, since it was written after a series of long conversation with
Sharon himself, who was interested in the publication, although "not for
quotation".
Here are some quotations: "The cornerstone of the whole
political-military concept of Sharon is the idea that a Palestinian state
should be set up on the E a s t Bank of the Jordan river.Logic dictates that
this can only be achieved by war (in Lebanon).a real war, aimed at solving
all the problems in Lebanon.(including) the liquidation of the PLO
camps.(the war) will move the PLO and its military forces from Lebanon to
Syria.It is better that the PLO forces will be located in South Syria, on
the Jordanian border.(therefore) a big war with Lebanon and Syria.with the
aim of getting the Syrians out of Lebanon, turning Lebanon over to the
Christians and to move the PLO to Amman."
The plan aimed at moving the Palestinians from the camps in Lebanon,
through Syria to Jordan. This was possible only by the creation of a panic,
which would induce the multitude of Palestinians to flee eastwards.
If the BBC had published this document, it would have arrived, perhaps,
at far-reaching conclusions. Fortunately for Sharon, they have not.
He should be grateful to them.
_______________________________________________________________________

Twenty years on, Sharon is up to no good
Robert Fisk in Beirut

27 June 2001

Ariel Sharon is telling the Americans some very old stories. The
Palestinians are involved in "international terrorism". The south of
Lebanon is a "centre of international terror". There are 2,000 long-
range missiles in Lebanon.

This is what he's been telling his American friends in Washington.
And it's exactly what he told Ronald Reagan's administration in 1981
and early 1982. Then, he was looking for a "green light" for a major
military adventure. Is he doing the same again today? Mr Sharon's
first accusation was at the expense of Lebanon. The Iranians, he
announced two months ago, had shipped through Lebanese airports 2,000
missiles that were capable of hitting central Israel.

But there are no such missiles in Lebanon. Beirut airport is one of
the most secure in the Middle East and not a single satellite picture
has been produced to support this nonsense. Then last week, Mr Sharon
was telling the UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, that the south of
Lebanon has been "infiltrated by Iran" and is a "centre of
international terror". The Lebanese government, he announced, would
be held "responsible".

Which is even more perverse. For, despite several attacks in the past
12 months, southern Lebanon is quieter now than it has been for 25
years. Israeli and Lebanese casualties in the border area have been
the lowest for a quarter of a century. Not surprisingly because
they've been through this before the Lebanese are asking if the
Israeli Prime Minister is preparing the ground for another conflict.
So are the Palestinians. And it's worth going back to the record to
recall how Mr Sharon, then Defence Minister in Menachem Begin's Likud
government, said almost exactly the same things about the same people
20 years ago, before a bloodbath that ended in the camps of Sabra and
Chatila.

In 1981, the UN had brokered a ceasefire between the Israelis and
Palestinians along the south Lebanese border. If there were no
Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel, there would be no Israeli air
raids on Lebanon, not unlike the current US-brokered truce. Then in
1982, Abu Nidal's anti-Arafat extremist group tried to murder the
Israeli ambassador to London. Mr Sharon blamed Yasser Arafat and
started bombing Beirut. The Palestinians fired back across the border
and the Israelis blamed the Palestinian leader for breaking the
ceasefire. Sound familiar? Then Israel invaded Lebanon. In Israel
today, where many on the right are urging the Israeli army to invade
Palestinian towns and cities after the wicked suicide-bombing in Tel
Aviv, the same Mr Arafat is being accused by the Defence Minister,
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, of having "links" with the Saudi militant Osama
bin Laden. There is no more proof that Mr Arafat is connected to Mr
bin Laden than there was that he had "links" with Abu Nidal. In fact,
Abu Nidal hated Mr Arafat. And Mr bin Laden always opposed Mr
Arafat's policies. But with Mr bin Laden, and Iran, variously blamed
by America for bombing attacks against US embassies, military bases
and a warship in Yemen, Mr Sharon is using a formula calculated to
have wide appeal to the Bush administration.

Back in 1982, he went to see Alexander Haig for a "green light" to
invade Lebanon. So the Arab press are asking if he is not now seeking
a "green light" for an offensive against the Palestinians from the US
Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. For it's also worth remembering
just what the Israelis did when they reached Beirut in 1982; they
surrounded it with gunboats and tanks and bombed it from the air. Mr
Sharon's men have already done the same, on a smaller scale, against
Gaza. The story of Gaza in 2001, complete blockade, attacks with F-
16s and gunboats and tanks, is exactly the same story as Beirut in
1982.

And, of course, it was Mr Sharon in 1982 who invented the
2,000 "terrorists" in Sabra and Chatila in reality packed with
unarmed civilians before sending the Phalange into the camps. And we
all know what happened then. Today, instead of 2,000
fantasy "terrorists", he's invented 2,000 fantasy missiles and has
been telling the Americans the same rubbish about Arafat's "terror"
links. In all seriousness, the Los Angeles Times yester- day carried
a headline that Mr Sharon was "pitching retaliation" as a possible
policy. Pitching? Policy?

If Mr Sharon is looking for a "green light", he may get it.
____________________________________________________________
© 2001 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd
_______________________________________________________________________

Bericht bij het overlijden van Israel Shahak.
[Ontleend aan MID-EAST REALITIES http://www.MiddleEast.Org]

Dr. Israel Shahak, Professor Emeritus of Chemistry at Hebrew University,
headed the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights.
Wrote "Jewish History, Jewish Religion" (Pluto Press, 1994).
As head of The Israeli League for Civil and Human Rights he was instrumental
in 1977 in persuading editors at The London Sunday Times to publish the
first international exposure of Israel's torture of Palestinian prisoners.
Made in the 1980s and early 90s his monthly "Shahak Papers"- ten to fifteen
single-spaced pages of translations from the Hebrew Press, headed by his
commentaries.

----------- Israel Shahak writing 6 years ago -----------

ANALYSIS OF ISRAELI POLICIES:

THE PRIORITY OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR

By Israel Shahak

At the time of this writing the end of the "peace process"
initiated in Madrid and Oslo is all too evident. It has failed
primarily because the Israeli government did nothing to make the
majority of the Palestinians in the Territories support it, at
least temporarily, although it could have obtained their support
without sacrificing any major imperial Israeli interests. Many
commentators, including some well-intentioned ones, are wringing
their hands imploring Rabin to refrain from taking another
provocative step - e.g the further confiscation of land in East
Jerusalem as decided on April 30, 1995. Those commentators fail
to take into account that Rabin's policies have an internal logic
and consistency based on the consensus of Labor Zionism as formed
already in the 1920s. This report will describe those policies,
to conclude that their analysis and prediction are very easy to
make on the assumption that they constitute an application of the
Zionist ideology which tends to override pragmatic
considerations. The apparent exceptions to this rule, e.g.
Israeli withdrawals from formerly conquered territories, are also
explainable in terms of idelogical factors, in this instance in
terms of the loss of Jewish lives in unsuccessful or inconclusive
wars and of the wish to avoid further losses of Jewish lives.

For instance, as pointed out by Tanya Reinhart (Yediot Ahronot,
May 1, 1995) in all Rabin's interviews to the Hebrew press
published on the Passover Eve, April 14, he reiterated his
ideological commitment to the principle that only the Jews "have
the right over the entire Land of Israel". Rabin didn't bother to
specify the exact borders of the Land in question: he only
admitted that "it is also inhabited by 2 million Palestinians"
who constitute "a problem" which only Labor knows how to solve.
This is a standard formula of Labor and center Zionism which
hasn't changed for more than 75 years.

On the same day "a senior officer of the Central Command of the
Israeli army", which is in charge of the West Bank, was
interviewed by Nahum Barnea (Yediot Ahronot, April 14). The
officer defined "the official policy of the Israeli army as
providing every Jew in every settlement, whether of the West Bank
or the Gaza Strip, with exactly the same degree of security and
well-being as Jews of Haifa and Tel Aviv have during all stages
of the peace process and afterwards". Needless to say, nothing
was said about security of the Palestinians who, more than before
Oslo, are harassed by the settlers backed by the army and by
Arafat's secret polices backed by the Shabak. The officer also
singled out with pride the ever increasing number of Palestinian
administrative detainees in the West Bank (3,600 according to
him, more than 5,000 according to my sources), adding that "the
detention orders which in the past have been issued for only half
a year are now issued for an entire year". He promised that the
Israeli army will soon take many other steps such as "the
confiscation of property" of individuals considered to be "Hamas
supporters" and as "decisive measures against the mosques. Not
every mosque is affiliated with Hamas, but a mosque which we will
consider as so affiliated will be dealt with utmost firmness".

The plan which the Israeli army already implements in the
Territories (known as "Rainbow of Colors") was published in the
Hebrew press in November 1994, but its crucial feature, the
"bypassing roads" on which only the Jewish settlers, their
visitors and the Israeli army will be permitted to drive, was
discussed by the press already in September. Reinhart (ibid.)
notes that the plan had been "formulated already in the early
1980s" by the settlers, but under Likud and "national unity"
governments nothing much was done to implement it. "It is 'the
peace government' which opened new vistas for the plan's
implementation". The annual cost of the plan is one billion
shekel [$330 million], to be continued for 3 years. Most of the
cost, as noted by Meir Shteglitz (Yediot Ahronot, April 9) Israel
expects to covered by the U.S. Relying on an interview given by
the commander of the Central Command, general Biran, to Haaretz
(April 28), Reinhart described the plan as "envisaging maximal
defense of all existing Jewish settlements and the partition of
the West Bank into enclaves containing Arab localities. Each
enclave is to be surrounded by bypassing roads, settlements and
Israeli army fortresses. The situation will be then the same as
in the Gaza Strip". (I will deal with the Gaza Strip later.) "If
Israel ever decides to withdraw its troops from any downtown area
of an Arab city [of the West Bank], the plan is to guarantee that
the Israeli army will continue to rule that city from outside".
Indeed, "control from outside" is a favorite term of Rabin and
other Labor stalwarts, in use from before the June 1992
elections.

Actually the plan was formulated already in 1977 by Ariel Sharon
and it was then described in the Hebrew press in detail. At that
time Sharon was still "only" an Agriculture minister. Rabin and
Peres, fresh from their defeat in the 1977 elections didn't
object to the plan, but Begin and Weizman, (Defense minister
1977-1980) did, since they assigned higher priority to making
peace with Egypt. When Begin began to lose his sanity and Sharon
became Defense minister, the highest priority was assigned to the
invasion of Lebanon. To the best of my knowledge, the plan under
current implementation has since remained the Israeli Security
System's "preferable solution" to "the problem" of Palestinians
in the Territories. According to the information available in the
Hebrew press, the plan began to be implemented in the Gaza Strip
right after Oslo. Reinhart quotes press sources showing that in
the West Bank the beginnings of its implementation date from July
1994, when in an amicable meeting Rabin agreed with the Gush
Emunim leaders "who explained to him that construction of the
bypassing roads lay in a common interest of the government and
the Jewish settlers. And at the same time Rabin was told the same
by [the then Chief of Staff] Barak". The plan was welcomed by
Gush Emunim leaders in their internal writings, but attacked
whenever they addressed the general public. According to general
Biran (ibid.) the plan "was intended to give the settlers the
full opportunity to live a normal life. I take this occasion to
stress that no Jewish settlement whatsover will ever be removed
from its place. In order to achieve this goal the Israeli army is
now implementing a number of plans, such as the construction of
the bypassing roads and of a separate electricity and water
networks intended to guarantee that each Jewish settlement will
have maximum security and welfare".

Reinhart provides a sophisticated but in my view insufficient
explanation of why the apartheid-like "Rainbow of Colors" plan
was welcomed by the "Peace Now" and by most of both Jewish and
Palestinian "peace camp". All too clearly, the plan favored the
settlers and was intended to perpetuate the Israeli conquest of
the Territories more effectually than before by "control from
outside". Yet "Peace Now" extolled this racist plan as "a
positive sign of implementation of the peace process", and its
leaders rushed to convince Arafat in Gaza about its virtues.
Noting that the settlers and all the right-wing censured the
"Rainbow of Colors" plan as "selling out the Land to the
Gentiles", Reinhart observes that "the religious settlers and
Likud had long ago discovered a panaceum for neutralizing the
left. As soon as they attack the government, the doves of various
persuasions stand to attention ready to help the government
pursue the 'peace process'. The result is that the supporters of
a plan devised by the settlers can pass for 'peace lovers'. The
more one insists that the government speeds up carrying out this
plan in the whole of the West Bank, the more reputation for
'peace loving' he acquires. And whoever dares to oppose this plan
is instantly censured by the doves for 'sabotaging the peace' and
branded as one of those 'extremists from both sides' who by
virtue of opposing Rabin's policies is 'objectively against
peace'".

This explanation is correct on a tactical level. It clearly
points out how the Oslo process in effect advanced the cause of
the Israeli apartheid, by virtue of making it possible to brand
every Jewish or Palestinian opponent of racism as "enemy of
peace". Yet in my view Reinhart, like many other Jewish leftists,
misses the main point. I wholeheartedly agree with her prognosis
of the effects of the "Rainbow of Colors" upon the Palestinians.
She writes: "The meaning of the plan is that we will solve the
problem of 2 million Palestinians in the Territories by
imprisoning them in ghettoes, starving them and turning them into
beggars. But instead of calling it 'an occupation', we will
present it as a step toward a Palestinian state. We will pry
Palestinian throats with our boots while smiling to them nicely".
[A clear allusion to Shimon Peres, I. Shahak.] But the point
which Reinhart misses is that Labor's version of Jewish racism
has always been much more hypocritical and hence more dangerous
than Likud's, but also more noxious in terms of actual oppressing
of its victims. I will return to this point below.

Meron Benvenisti's presentation (Haaretz, April 27) is similar to
Reinhart's. He also derides the Zionist doves who support Israeli
brutalities committed after Oslo in general and the "Rainbow of
Colors" in particular, while reassuring the Palestinians that
these are means conducive to the Palestinian state, "at first
only in the Gaza Strip". Benvenisti says that "far from promoting
justice, peace or progress, a world-view reduced to establishing
a state as its single goal cannot but be empty, deceitful and
conforming to Israeli interests. Now, when the Palestinian
Authority already has an autonomous authority in domestic
affairs, its corruption and arbitrariness in the Gaza Strip
cannot stand in greater contrast from the ideals of human freedom
and dignity, and from the struggle against deprivation. Hence,
even if Israel grants Arafat a semblance of a state, no relief
can be expected in the conditions of oppression, control and
exploitation. Such conditions were dictated by Israel to Arafat
in the Oslo and Cairo Accords. This is why no conceivable change
of labels may prompt the Palestinian population to ideologically
identify with Arafat's regime". Benvenisti says that Israel may
possibly agree to Arafat's statehood, but only in order to
present it as a "seeming concession enabling Israel to demand
from the Palestinians in return 'more flexibility', in
acquiescing to the perpetuation of the Israeli colonial rule over
the Territories". I don't think the Labor government will ever
agree to independent Palestinian state, even in the Gaza Strip
alone. The talk about such a prospect was no more than a typical
ploy by Shimon Peres, intended to extract from Arafat more
compliance with Israeli demands. Had Labor intended to establish
a Palestinian state, it would have exploited it in the fast
approaching Israeli election campaign. Moreover, Rabin would have
sought to justify it in his numerous Passover Eve interviews. Yet
the Israeli government has done nothing in order to explain and
justify such a policy change to the Israeli public.

To describe the aims of the "Rainbow of Colors" apartheid,
Benvenisti speaks, in my view all too cogently, of "conceptual
ethnic cleansing i.e. of erasing the others from one's
consciousness. It cannot be attributed to chance that the so-
called 'peace process with the Palestinians' is in Jewish society
accompanied by an unusually high incidence of ethnocentrism
approaching racism, of tribal forms of morality and of the
failure to distinguish between the moral right to exist and the
moral obligation to behave decently". Among Benvenisti's examples
of such "incidence", a particularly outrageous (at least in my
view) was the imposition of a round-the-clock curfew on
Palestinians of Hebron so as to let the visitors of Jewish
settlers "hold a picnic", and roam around the city in perfect
safety. For a single day during the Passover week the city was
for this purpose filled up with troops: a circumstance which let
the picnickers exult over Palestinians confined in their houses
and throw stones at them, especially if their dared to look out
from their windows. The whole thing was intended as a concession
of Rabin to Gush Emunim. It nevertheless failed to prevent the
latter to use the day for the grossest forms of abuse of what
they call "the government of wickedness", including public
prayers to God to "abolish it quickly".

Benvenisti concludes, rightly in my view, that "the Oslo process,
the resultant ideology of segregation and the resultant security
considerations are intended to vest [Israeli] ethnic cleansing
with an aura of respectability. Sure, my use of that term may be
viewed as a manifestation of extremism compared to its usual use
as an elegant term for expulsions and mass murders. But in my
view ethnic cleansing may also be more limited in time. A closure
of the Territories or a curfew intended to cleanse the public
space from the presence of "others" are perfect examples of such
conceptual ethnic cleansing limited in time".

Danny Rabinovitz (Haaretz, April 25), whom I am going to quote
extensively, tries to capture the difference between the Israeli
right- wing and Rabin and his supporters. "The right-wing would
have liked that Israeli troops would have reentered Gaza [Strip]
so as to let Israel itself deal with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.
In contrast, Rabin and his Jewish supporters are worshipping the
Moloch of segregation and dream about creating a tough and
sophisticated Palestinian Authority capable of eradicating terror
and thus letting the Jews live in perfect security. On the
surface, these may seem two very different approaches, not merely
to the problem of terror but also to the solution of the Jewish-
Palestinian conflict. On one side the nostalgic right-wing vision
of 'Greater Israel' and on the other 'Pax Israeliana' of the
humanistic and peace-loving left. On closer inspection, however,
what may be called 'Rabin's vision' may make one wonder whether
the difference between the left and the right on those fateful
issues is really that great. What will be the meaning of peace,
if Arafat accepts the current Israeli proposals and becomes a
guardian of security of the Jews by successfully trying to
eradicate the extremists in the Gaza [Strip]? This was precisely
the nightmare of the Palestinian opponents of Oslo, whether
religious or secular. They feared that what went under the name
of 'the peace process' was to be nothing more than a change in
forms of the Israeli military conquest from a cruel but a
temporary regime, into a durable form of political and economic
enslavement, not only more oppressive but also more perpetual".

Let me omit Rabinovitz's historical analysis of Arafat's role as
a linchpin in the long succession of the Ottoman, British,
Jordanian and Israeli "mukhtars" [village headmen], granted the
security of tenure together with opportunities for exploitation
of others, in exchange for being responsible to "the authorities"
for guaranteeing good behavior of people under their
jurisdiction. Currently, says Rabinovitz, "Rabin wants Arafat to
become Israel's 'rais' [headman or contractor in Arabic or
Hebrew] for security of Jewish lives, threatening that in the
event of his failure in this task, Israel will stop the
negotiations, impose a perpetual closure of the Territories and
stop the flow of money from the Western states. However, if
Arafat performs his job as required, Rabin will reward him by
granting him the security of tenure as a Mukhtar... It is true
that Rabin has decisively opted against militaristic form of
colonialism, but what the [Israeli] left proposes instead is
nothing less than a neo-colonialist form of perpetual
domination...

"It is still unclear whether Arafat wants to fight Hamas and
whether he believes that he can defeat it. But Arafat can defeat
Hamas only in a way which guarantees his stay in power as an
Israeli puppet heading the crowds of his secret police agents, a
sort of a Palestinian Antoine Lahad responsible for another
'security zone'. In such a case it may be possible to maintain
Arafat in power with the help of money from Western states and
other means Israel would take to maintain him in power. But in
such a case Arafat cannot be expected to deliver political
benefits which only a legitimate leadership with a popular
mandate could deliver. This is why the difference between the
respective solutions of [Israeli] left and right do not seem to
be so great. The right-wing solution is cruder, more violent and
more short-sighted of the two, whereas the leftist solution is
better adapted to current international fashions. But neither
succeeds in protecting us from the cold wind entering through the
tear and wear in the cloak, so hastily patched up in Oslo in
order to keep us cozily warm".

Those developments could have been predicted (and have in fact
been predicted in my reports) by those who took the trouble to
analyze the actual Zionist policies pursued since the 1920s, and
after 1967 in the Territories. Let me begin with Israel itself.
The laws of the State of Israel pertaining to the use of land are
based on the principle of discrimination against all non-Jews.
The State of Israel has turned most of the land in Israel (about
92%) into "state land". After those lands are defined as owned by
the State of Israel they can be leased for long periods only to
Jews. The right to a long-term lease of such land is denied to
all non- Jews without a single exception. This denial is enforced
by placing all state lands under the administration by the Jewish
National Fund, a branch of the World Zionist Organization, whose
racist statutes forbid their long-term lease, or any other use,
to non- Jews. Their lease to Jews, conditioned upon the
prohibition of sub-lease to non-Jews, is granted for the period
of 49 years with an automatic renewal for another 49 year period.
Consequently, they are treated as property and are bought, sold
and mortgaged, provided the party to the deal is Jewish. The
small and decreasing number of cases of leasing state land to
non-Jews for grazing is never for more than 11 months. A Jewish
leasee of state land is allowed, often subsidized or otherwise
encouraged, to develop the land and especially to build a house
for himself there, but non-Jewish leasee is strictly prohibited
to do so. Leasing state land to a non-Jew is always accompanied
by restrictive conditions, such as the prohibition of
construction or any other development or sub-leasing it to
somebody else. By the way, membership of all kibbutzim and
moshavim (whose supposed "socialist" or "utopian" character is so
stridently advertized outside Israel) is strictly limited to Jews
by virtue of their being all located on state land. Non- Jews who
desire to become members of a kibbutz, even a kibbutz whose
Jewish members are atheists, must convert to Judaism. The kibbutz
movements, in cooperation with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate, are
keeping special training facilities for preparing "easy", (i.e in
most cases fake) conversions to Judaism for such people.

As a consequence the Galilee can be described as the land of
apartheid. Palestinian localities are bursting with population
growth but are surrounded by state land which they cannot use it
in order to expand. The town of Sakhnin in the Galilee, inhabited
by about 25,000 Palestinians, is surrounded from three sides by
state land allotted to three kibbutzim founded in 1970s for the
express purpose to "guard state land" from "Arab encroachment".
Those kibbutzim are in every respect failures. The original
members had long ago left them and so did their successors, but
new Jewish volunteers (mostly from the "peace camp") are being
sent there all the time. Those kibbutzim receive huge subsidies,
both from the Israeli government and from the Jewish Agency i.e.
ultimately from tax-free contributions of Jews all around of
world. No one proposes, even for the sake of efficiency or
winning support of the Palestinians for the peace process, that
even the tiniest part of state land around Sakhnin be allotted to
non-Jews of that town. Obviously, an ideological consideration
overrides all political considerations, like in religion the
sacred always overrides the profane.

There are many states which in the past were systematically
engaged in land robbery. The USA, for example, robbed the Indians
of their land, transforming most of it into state land.
Nevertheless, this land is now available for use by any USA
citizen. If a Jew were in the USA prohibited to lease land
belonging to the state only because he were Jewish, this would be
rightly interpreted as anti-Semitism. But anti- Semitism is
already considered in the USA disreputable, whereas in Israel
"Zionism" is the official state-ideology and is indoctrinated as
a goal of public education. Of course, the land issue is no more
that a single (but crucial) example of official racism and
discrimination against the non-Jews. But racism pervades all
walks of life in Israel, victimizing mainly the Palestinians.
Some Zionists recently want to alleviate its effects, but no
Zionist party nor Zionist politician has ever proposed to abolish
it or had second thoughts about its underlying ideology. The
whole discriminatory system is obviously intended to be practiced
in the foreseeable future.

It is easy to see that by the rigorous enforcement of such laws,
also against most loyal supporters of the state, Israel is
undermining its own imperial and military power. Let me give two
instances of this. The first concerns the Druzes who, as
discussed in report 153, are serving in the Israeli army, police
and intelligence, often reaching high ranks in those services.
They are nevertheless legally barred from use of the state land
and as non-Jews they suffer from other discriminatory laws as
well. The same can be said about other Palestinians who either
serve in the above mentioned security services or reach high
ranks in various branches of civil service, for example as
judges. Israel had appointed Palestinians to be its consuls and
other diplomatic representatives. It is now contemplating an
appointment of the first Palestinian ambassador. But a
Palestinian general, ambassador or judge is still subject to the
discussed discriminatory laws. He still does not have the right
to lease even a small plot of state land, whereas any released
Jewish murderer has this right as matter of course.

Right now, Palestinians may or may not perceive themselves as
victims of Israeli discrimination. Many of them are too mystified
by their feudal mindset to perceive it clearly. If anything, that
mindset dictates to them an almost exclusive concern with the
loss of ancestral property. But their eventual modernization is
inevitable. It is anticipated even by the Israeli "Arabist
experts" who are no fools. As soon as it comes, the Palestinians
are bound to perceive themselves first and foremost as victims of
Israeli legal discrimination, applied against them by virtue of
their being non-Jews. When this occurs, Israel's domestic and
international position can be expected to become highly unstable.
Some Israeli decision-makers can be presumed to be aware of it.
It can even be presumed that a major reason of the Oslo process
was the hope (common for Israel and Arafat) to arrest the process
of Palestinian society's change by using force to refeudalize it.
But the Israeli experts must know that the probability of
arresting social change is very low, at least within Israel. In
other words, Israel as an imperial power is not even
contemplating to adapt itself to changing circumstances in a way
other imperial powers did with success. To return to the Druze
case: even if brigadier-general (reserves) Muhammad Kana'an who
performed to perfection the duties of military commander of the
Gaza Strip during the Intifada and who yet, as a non- Jew is as
discriminated against by Israel as any other non-Jew, is not
aware of this fact, his sons and sons of other Druze are sure to
be aware of it in a not so distant a future.

The second example concerns the two Arab villages in Galilee,
Bir'am and Ikrit. The inhabitants of both are Christians who
didn't resist Israeli forces in 1948, and who surrendered as soon
as the Israeli army was approaching. Their inhabitants were
evacuated "for two weeks only", as was solemnly promised in the
capitulation accord signed by the Israeli army. After two weeks,
however, the army reneged on its promise. In 1951 the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the villagers' return, but its verdict
was soon overruled on the basis of the "Defense Regulations
1945". These regulations had originally been passed by the
British to be used against the Jews. Before the creation of the
State of Israel they were described by some most respected Jewish
legal authorities in Palestine as "Nazilike laws", or as "even
worse than the Nazi laws", because they provided the government
with an almost unlimited powers on the condition of exercising
them through the army. Begin's Deputy Prime Minister, Simha
Erlich, quipped that "these Regulations let a general commanding
the Jerusalem district or a Defense minister surround the Knesset
by tanks and arrest its members with perfect legality". The State
of Israel nevertheless kept them in force, applying them,
however, almost exclusively against non-Jews. In the case of
Bir'am and Ikrit Ben Gurion's was able to respond to the Supreme
Court's verdict by using the "Defense Regulations 1945" to
confiscate land belonging to the two villages and by ordering the
Airforce to bomb both villages on Christmas Eve of 1951, with the
adult male villagers rounded up and forced to watch from the
nearby hill how their houses were being demolished. Only the
churches were spared from destruction: they serve to this day as
destinations for pilgrimage for the former villagers who retain
their Israeli citizenship. The remainder of the land was
allocated to kibbutzim and moshavim, with a "left-wing" kibbutz
(which even adopted Bir'am's name) receiving a lion's share. The
Supreme Court ruled that those confiscations and demolition
orders had been perfectly legal.

Nevertheless, the inhabitants of the two villages, have been
campaigning till this very day: particularly those of Bir'am who
are all of Maronite religion and many quite right-wing
politically. Rationally speaking, their campaign could have good
chances to succeed, especially after they solemnly and repeatedly
declared that they didn't demand their farmlands, but only the
church, the neighboring cemetery and a tiny plot nearby to be
used as a museum. All pragmatic considerations would be in favor
of accepting their modest request. After all, many of them serve
in the Israeli police. They have close connections with Maronites
in Lebanon which Israel had exploited before and during its
invasion of Lebanon. Their case is supported by the Catholic
Church and other important international bodies. Yet there is no
chance that their request may be accepted, least so by the
current "peace government".

For the analysis of Israeli policies in the era of the "peace
process" it is even more important to recall that by the time
Oslo Accord was signed Israel had already turned about 70% of the
West Bank land into "state land" which, like in Israel, could be
leased only to Jews. (By further confiscations this percentage
has after Oslo risen to 72% or 73% but for the purpose of this
report I will use the round figure 70%.) All the West Bank
settlements, being built on this land, are intended only for the
Jews, who don't even need to be Israeli. The Jews from the entire
world are entitled to settle on this land. Hence the Western
media are wrong (possibly even deliberately) in their persistent
use of the term "Israeli settlements". The fact is that a non-
Jewish Israeli citizen, like brigadier-general (reserves)
Muhammad Kana'an, is denied the legal right to settle in these
settlements; and so are Christians who fervently support the
cause of "Greater Israel". If we suppose that one day the Spirit
will command reverend Falwell or reverend Robertson to leave
their holy work in the U.S. in order to settle in Kiryat Arba,
they won't be allowed to as non-Jews. But if we suppose that the
Spirit will command them to convert to Judaism, they will become
legally eligible to settle in any Jewish settlement right from
the moment their conversion is finalized. This is not just a
theoretical possibility, as groups of converts to Judaism from
some obscure tribes in Peru and India have actually been brought
and settled in the Territories.

On the other hand, there have been several attempts of Druze
veterans (some of whom profess very hawkish views) to apply for
an allotment of West Bank state land in order to establish a
Druze settlement there. All such requests were firmly denied,
against best Israeli interest. Moreover, especially since the
inception of the Intifada, Palestinian collaborators living in
fear of death have persistently requested the Israeli authoritues
to let them settle in Jewish settlements of the West Bank, even
temporarily. As some of them argued, this would be highly
advantageous to Israeli intelligence since they could live close
to their former homes and be able to maintain to some extent
their former contacts. Yet again, all such requests were firmly
denied. After Oslo Israel had to remove some collaborators from
the West Bank and settle them in Israel. But even then, instead
of allotting them any state land, it rented private land or
private housing for the purpose.

Let me return to the West Bank land issue. Of 70% of its land
which became state land, only 16% has actually been allocated to
Jewish settlements. The remaining 54% stand empty. It needs to be
acknowledged that removing Jewish settlements, or perhaps even a
single one of them, may well give rise to grave political
problems, including the risk of armed clashes which may even
escalate into a civil war. (Such dangers have been repeatedly
discussed in my reports.) But the prospect of returning some or
even the whole of the 54% of the not yet settled state land back
to the Palestinian peasants carries only minimal risks. It could
have been done easily during the first 6-8 months after Oslo.
Since the attachment of the Palestinians, (not only the peasants
but of the entire nation) to the land is profound, and the well-
justified fear of being driven away from it palpable, one can
easily imagine the effect of an even partial restitution of the
empty 54% of the West Bank land on the Palestinian masses. A
better way of binding Palestinian public opinion to Israeli
interests served by the Oslo and Cairo Accords could hardly be
imagined.

The same is true for the Gaza Strip. If anything, its case is
more glaring because the number of Jewish settlers there, 5,000
when the Oslo Accord was signed, increased since to about 8,000,
is incommensurably smaller than the number of Jewish settlers in
the West Bank, 130,000 when the Oslo Accord was signed, increased
since to about 160,000, East Jerusalem excluded. Also, the
proportion of Jewish settlers to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip
(officially 800,000, in reality about million) is completely
different in scale than the proportion of the West Bank Jewish
settlers to West Bank Palestinians (officially about 1.200,000,
in reality about 1.300,000 excluding East Jerusalem.) Yet about
28% of the Strip's area duly converted to state land, was
allotted to Jewish settlers long before Oslo and after Oslo
withheld from the autonomy's jurisdiction. Also in the Strip no
empty state land was restored to Palestinian ownership. In the
case of the Gaza Strip I don't know the proportion of the empty
to the settled state lands, but I do know that the former exist.
In the single case of settlement of Netzarim (whose residents,
far from doing any farming, are for the most part engaged in
studying Talmud), detailed maps have been published in the Hebrew
press (for example, Haaretz, April 10). The maps show a large
land area attached to that settlement, necessarily empty but of
course denied to the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Rabin hasn't even contemplated giving back to
Palestinian peasants, or even to the Palestinian Authority, a few
symbolic dunums of the state land around Netzarim. True, some
Zionist "peaceniks" are advocating the removal of the whole
settlement of Netzarim as causing loss of too many Jewish lives.
As mentioned above, this is regarded as a factor which may
temporarily override ideological considerations. But no Zionist
"peace lover" has as yet advocated the return of an empty state
land for the sake of a mere political advantage. This can be
generalized. The peace process was "sold" to Israeli Jews public
not only as an effectual means of guaranteeing their security,
but also as a potential for profits from trade with Arab states
expected in its wake to expand. Nevertheless, just as in the case
discussed above, no Zionist has ever dared to propose that the
ideology of discriminating against non-Jews be for once
sacrificed for the sake of advancing the Oslo process and thus
enhancing Israel's power and wealth. To the best of my
recollection, Israel (or Zionist Movement before Israel's
inception) has never sacrificed its ideology on the altar of
merely political considerations or economic interests.

In other words, empirical evidence (valid as anything in politics
can be valid) shows that Israeli policies are primarily
ideologically motivated and that the ideology by which they are
motivated is totalitarian in nature. This ideology can be easily
known since it is enshrined in the writings of the founders of
Labor Zionism, and it can be easily inferred from Israeli laws,
regulations and pursued policies. Those who, like Arafat, his
henchmen and most Palestinian intellectuals, have through all
these years failed to make an intellectual effort to seriously
study this ideology, have only themselves to blame for being
stunned by all the developments of the 20 months after Oslo.
Whoever after Oslo stopped denouncing Israeli "imperialism" for
the sake of a meaningless "peace of the brave" slogan, only
showed that he learned nothing and forgot nothing. Their blunder
is all the greater since Israel has by no means been unique in
pursuing ideologically determined policies. Strict ideological
considerations determine policies in plenty of other past and
present states. In other cases an ideology underlying a given
policy, however, is not only openly admitted by a state
concerned, but also well-known and discussed beyond its borders.
Israel is indeed unique in that the discriminatory Jewish
ideology dictating its policies is hardly ever discussed beyond
its borders, due to the fear of offending the Jews of the
diaspora and of being labelled by their powerful organizations as
an "anti-Semite" or "Jewish self-hater". At the same time in
Israel the ideology of discriminating against all non-Jews is not
only openly admitted but also advocated as guaranteeing the
character of Israel as a "Jewish state" mandated to preserve its
"Jewish character". The Jewish supporters of Israeli
discriminatory practices freely admit that they thus want to
preserve the "Jewish character" of Israel, conceived of by them
and by the majority of Israeli Jews, as legacy of historical
Judaism. Indeed, if we overlook the modern times, there is
sufficient truth in this claim. Until the advent of modern times
all Jews firmly believed that non-Jews should be discriminated
against whenever possible. It now turns out that the Jewish
Enlightenment failed to change the attitudes of all, or perhaps
even of most, Jews in this respect. Many completely irreligious
Jews still believe that for the sake of the Jewish religious law
and tradition which commanded to discriminate the non-Jews the
latter should be discriminated in the "Jewish state" forever.
This is professed in spite, or perhaps even because of the
undeniable fact that this discrimination has the same character
as that which the anti-Semites want to apply against the Jews.

In the light of the impact of the ideology upon the actual
Israeli policies the critiques of the latter by Reinhart,
Benvenisti and Rabinovitz discussed at the beginning of this
report are valid, yet in one crucial respect inadequate. For all
their superiority to the "experts in Israeli affairs" from the
Western press, the named authors seem always puzzled by the
policies Israel is pursuing. They never cease offering the
Israeli government "good advice" of how it can gain in its
relations with the Arabs by "being moderate". Analysis and
experience show that offering such an advice amounts to an
exercise in futility. Numerous historical analogies, including
the recent collapse of Communist regimes in Europe, show
conclusively that a real change is impossible as long as a party
representing no matter how flexibly a state ideology stays in
power. In Israel power is firmly in the hand of the Security
System and of the Zionist parties whose deep commitment to the
Zionist ideology has not been challenged. On the other hand, the
mentioned analogies show that once the power of a state ideology
is challenged in public, it means that a real change is on its
way. Eventually, such a change may materialize by a sudden
disintegration of the state ideology and the state apparatus
supporting it. This is what happened since the late 1970s in
Poland. KOR and Solidarity which challenged the ideological basis
of the state were the true harbingers of the fall of the entire
European communism; whereas the plethora of reforms imposed by
the Polish Communist party from above amounted to no more than
palliatives which changed nothing. The Israeli ideology which has
been only slightly undermined in the period of 1974-1993, has
been again revitalized in the aftermath of Oslo. Due to its
social cohesiveness, military and particularly nuclear power and
the increasing support of the U.S. Israel feels at present too
strong to offer even palliative concessions to Palestinians.
Under those conditions ideological considerations can remain to
be predominant, except when Jewish lives are lost.

>From high abstraction let me again pass to concretes. Omitting
facts already presented in report 151, let me now show how the
actual Israeli policies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank draw
from the ideology of continuous discrimination by means more
effectual than beforehand. Let me first deal with the Gaza Strip.
Detailed maps of the Strip often published by the Hebrew press
(but never by the Palestinian press!) show how it is criss-
crossed by "military roads" which according to Cairo Accords
remain under Israeli jurisdiction. Those roads are constantly
patrolled by the Israeli army, either separately or jointly with
the Palestinian police. The Israeli army has the right to close
any section of any such road to all Palestinian traffic, even if
it runs deep within the autonomy, and it actually uses this right
after any Palestinian assault. For example, Haaretz (April 11)
reported that the Israeli army closed "until further notice" two
road sections deep inside the autonomy "to all Palestinian
vehicles" after two assaults which occurred two days earlier.
Appended to the report was a map showing the Strip's roads. One
of them, called "Gaza city bypassing road", traverses the entire
length of the Strip, carefully bypassing the cities and refugee
camps. A military road and a narrow strip of land not included in
the autonomy cuts it off from Egypt. A number of parallel roads
traverse the Strip's autonomous area from the Israeli border on
its east side to the sea or a Jewish settlement block on the
west. All authorized entry points to the autonomy are located at
the beginning of military roads.

One such road is the Netzarim road. It begins at an authorized
entry point to the autonomy at Nahal Oz. From there it runs
westward, skirting all Palestinian localities. After crossing the
"Gaza city bypassing road" it reaches Netzarim. It does not end
there, however, but continues to a military fortress on the sea
shore. It thus cuts the Gaza Strip into two parts. A sector of
that road which approaches Netzarim is closed to all Palestinian
traffic. The obvious effect of that closure is to encourage
Hamas' assaults, as there is no risk that a Palestinian vehicle
may be hit there by mistake. This case is the best illustration
of the extent to which an ideological consideration can override
even elementary security precautions!

The overall effect is that the autonomous part of the Gaza Strip
is sliced into enclaves controlled by the bypassing roads. The
role of the Jewish settlements is not only to guard state land,
but also to serve as pivots of the road grid devised to ensure a
perpetual Israeli control of the Strip under a new and more
effectual form. This new form of control, referred to by Rabin
and other Labor politicians as "control from outside" allows the
army to dominate the Strip (and to reconquer it with a minimum
effort if need be) without having to commit large manpower for
constant patrolling and pacifying the Strip's towns and refugee
camps "from inside". The latter task is now being undertaken on
Israel's behalf by various uniformed and secret polices under
Arafat's command.

Let me proceed to discussing the West Bank. The task of the
"Rainbow of Colors" is to eventually produce results similar to
those already existing in the Gaza Strip. The conditions may
there even turn out worse, due to a much larger number of
settlers and to the extensive construction of the separate
networks of roads, electricity and water supplies for the
settlers which cannot but pass near or through the Palestinian
enclaves. (In the Gaza Strip, with few exceptions electricity and
water for the settlers are supplied either from Israel or from
the sites close to settlements.) Moreover, the West Bank includes
the "Greater Jerusalem" area in which the apartheid is practiced
more strictly than elsewhere. "Greater Jerusalem" officially
extends from Ramallah to the south of Bethlehem, but in the
future it can be assumed to grow. To make the matters worse, as
mentioned in report 151, the Palestinians from the Territories
are to be forever barred from crossing to Israel. Their labor
force is instead to be employed in "industrial parks" exporting
mostly to the U.S. Even at its worst South African apartheid was
not as all-inclusive as what is planned for the West Bank and
what already exists in the Gaza Strip.

How come the experts of the Israeli government expect
acquiescence to this situation on the part of the Palestinians
(including the Israeli citizens among them, whose influence in
Knesset can be considerable) and on the part of international
public opinion? The two questions seem to have a single answer.
Israeli experts and the government apparently anticipate to make
those realities palatable for both as long as Israel confines
itself only to "control from outside", while leaving "control
from inside", (i.e. the job of actually enforcing order) in the
hands of Israel's Palestinian proxies who will be granted a
semblance of an independent authority. (I am not going to discuss
international public opinion separately, because Latin American
and African precedents make me convinced that the response of the
world at large to the "control from inside" will be as tame and
as acquiescent as in Palestine.) Much as I abhor the Israeli
government's plans on moral grounds, this anticipation strikes me
as well-grounded. After all, a large majority of Palestinians
have tamely acquiesced to the numerous violations of human rights
committed directly by Arafat's regime in the Gaza Strip and by
his secret polices in the West Bank. (The potentially violent
dispute between Arafat and Hamas is about power rather than about
human or any other rights.)

The utmost the Palestinian opposition to Arafat is capable of
doing, is to send loyal petitions to "His Excellency, the
President", in which he is humbly requested to reconsider such
and such a decision of his. While a death of a Palestinian under
interrogation carried out by Israeli Shabak continues to be
fiercely resented, a death of a Palestinian under interrogation
carried out by Palestinian Shabak elicits only polite requests
for "an investigation". If "His Excellency" agrees to open an
investigation, he is complimented by everybody concerned: even if
the promised "investigation" does not materialize for months.
Quite numerous instances of killing the Palestinians by Arafat's
forces, let alone the routine beatings and humiliations pass with
hardly a notice. Even a sentence of death recently imposed by
Arafat's military court failed to provoke an outrage, and nothing
indicated a prospect of an outrageous response if it is actually
carried out.

Let me give a concrete example. When John Major visited Arafat in
Gaza, a Palestinian policeman killed a child aged 11. The killing
was, of course, officially described as an "accident"; an
"investigation" (which hasn't yet materialized) was promised,
exactly as had been customary when Israel had controlled the Gaza
Strip "from inside". But in terms of the impact of the child's
death on the Palestinian public in general and on the Gazan one
in particular the contrast couldn't be greater. Under Arafat's
rule, John Major's visit continued undisturbed. The official
explanation of "accidental death" was accepted by everyone,
except for the child's family. In the end even the family, when
firmly ordered "to shut its mouth" by Palestinian secret police,
did so, whereas since the inception of the Intifada similar
Israeli orders had been ignored. There were none of the usual
protests which had used to occur in the Strip when a child had
been killed by an Israeli soldier.

This is the place to recall that the standard of life in the
Strip has decreased by about 60% since Arafat arrived there. Of
course, the main responsibility for this state of affairs is
Israel's, although Arafat's contribution to it through his
corruption and inefficiency shouldn't be overlooked. But the
point I am trying to make is not at all economic. To keep the
Palestinians as poor as possible has always been an aim of
Israeli policy, in my view also in order to arrest social change
in their society. With Arafat's complicity Israel now can achieve
this aim without eliciting any strong protests, and without
spending much of its manpower on suppressing such protests. In
other words, it can impoverish the Palestinians cheaply and
effectually. Bureaucracies tend to believe that their successes
can be stretched indefinitely, and the Israeli Security System is
no exception. No wonder it believes that if a solution tested in
the Gaza Strip has worked well there, it would also work well
when "Rainbow of Colors" is implemented in the West Bank.
Likewise, the Security System probably believes that if the
Palestinian uniformed and secret polices obey Arafat's orders so
faithfully, they will continue to do so when commanded by
somebody else.

Those hypotheses about the Israeli Security System's modes of
thinking can be confirmed by facts. For example, while much land
is now being confiscated in the West Bank for the purpose of
constructing the bypassing roads, there have been few if any
popular protests against those confiscations. The protests of the
Palestinian Authority against the recent confiscations of land in
East Jerusalem stand in glaring contrast to its silence in cases
of the much more massive land confiscations currently going on
elsewhere in the West Bank. Danny Rubinstein (Haaretz, May 12)
explains that in case of Jerusalem Arafat is constrained to
protest by the leaders of Arab and Muslim states, for whose
publics Jerusalem is a particularly sensitive religious issue.
The same leaders, however, couldn't care less about the West
Bank. Rubinstein reports that "many delegations from West Bank
localities came recently to Arafat. Their grievances were many,
but they particularly emphasized that their lands were being
confiscated. Arafat did his best to mollify those delegations.
For example, a delegation of inhabitants of [the town of] Al-
Birah, located near Ramallah, who received land confiscation
orders from Israeli authorities intending to build a road
bypassing their town to serve the needs of the settlement of
Psagot, recently requested Arafat to intervene to make these
orders annulled. One delegate told me how stunned he was by
Arafat's response. Arafat told them: 'Forget this matter. This is
only a minor confiscation. It is preferable to have this land
confiscated than Psagot settlers driving through your town and
causing trouble. Owing to this confiscation, the settlers will at
least be able to bypass your town'". Rubinstein says that Arafat
is giving such "advice whenever he fears that his opposition to
an Israeli measure may result in cancellation of his negotiations
with Israel". I can confirm Rubinstein's view by information from
my own sources, both Israeli and Palestinian. Moreover, Arafat's
"advice" works, because it is backed by the people's fright of
his thugs. This is why most attempts to organize popular protests
against the confiscation of land have been stifled. Israel cannot
expect a support for its apartheid policies more effectual than
Arafat's.

Yet in two factual points I differ from the Israeli Security
System's assessments of Arafat's role. First, they ignore the
impact of Arafat's behavior on Jewish public in Israel. In order
to let Arafat serve Israeli interests effectually Israel must
salvage his dwindling prestige among the Palestinians, and for
that purpose leaves him a considerable freedom of expression,
never granted Palestinian collaborators before. Arafat takes
advantage of this privilege to indulge in the most outrageous
lies and to make the most provocative attacks on Israel. As an
example of the former one can give his oft-repeated assertion
that Israel (or Israeli army officers, or Shabak's agents)
conspired with Hamas to carry out the Beit-Lid terror assault. As
an example of the latter one can give his frequent assertion that
the entire Jerusalem (not only its Eastern part) belongs to the
Arabs or to the Muslims. While neither Rabin nor Peres dare to
expose Arafat as a liar or to denounce his position on Jerusalem
as incompatible with that of all Zionist parties (even Meretz
supports the so-called "unification of Jerusalem"), the Hebrew
press often does so, and so do the opposition's politicians.
Rabin's dwindling credibility and popularity can be attributed to
Jewish public's outrage at his condonement of Arafat's lies and
antics. To a much greater degree the same is the case of Peres
and the entire Israeli "peace camp" which seem to be losing
whatever political clout they once had. In other words, the
advantages of the "control from outside" are being neutralized by
domestic drawbacks of using Arafat. As the 1996 elections are
approaching, the latter factor can be assumed to increasingly
outweigh the former in importance.

The second point where I differ from the Israeli Security
System's assessments concerns the "Rainbow of Colors". The
Israeli experts assume it can last forever, whereas I think it is
bound to be rather short-lived. Even if Arafat commits
indescribable atrocities in smashing all opposition to his rule,
I doubt if he can keep the Palestinian population inside their
enclaves under his effective control. After all, the facts on the
ground will be all too tangible for the Palestinians, and the
arguments of the opposition particularly of Hamas, (unless
destroyed by Arafat's victory in a civil war) will be bound to
undermine Arafat's standing in a relatively short period of time.
So far his attempts to suppress the opposition, half-hearted at
best, have alternated with attempts to make a compromise with it.
His oppression can be said to have intimidated individuals and
small groups like the PDFL, but it has made Hamas stronger, more
influential and more outraged than before. It is impossible to
say whether Arafat will decide to accede to Israel's demands to
smash the opposition, or continue to play the same game of
serving Israel covertly and to opposing it in words. In any
event, however, the Palestinian masses see with increasing
clarity that their situation is rapidly deteriorating. At present
it is only Arafat's vestigial prestige which prevents them from
beginning to organize a popular resistance movement. Once all his
credibility is gone, which may occur quite soon, the only Israeli
alternative for still exercising "control from outside" would be
through a naked Palestinian dictatorship, whether Arafat's or
somebody else's. Oppression then unleashed is bound to surpass
anything experienced in the period of "control from inside".

I am fully conscious of the immense human suffering which such an
oppression is bound to cause. Yet I do not attribute much
political importance to the question whether it can succeed and
for how long. In any event, it will mark the failure of the
"control from outside" scheme as an easy and cheap method of
domination, which can be "sold", Peres-style, to the
international public. In the last analysis the failure of the
"control from outside" cannot but mark the end of Israeli
policies based on the absolute priority of Zionist ideology.

May 1995
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Uit: MiD-EasT RealitieS - http://www.MiddleEast.Org
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